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PROVISION OF A SAFETY NET FOR U.S. AGRICULTURE 
 
 
 
THE SHARP DECLINE in commodity 
prices in 1998 stepped up momentum for 
development of an improved U.S. 
agricultural safety net.  There is no 
consensus, however, about which policy 
path to follow, although a disaster assistance 
package passed by Congress before 
adjournment for the 1998 elections provides 
clues about the direction policy will travel. 
 
Congressional democrats proposed to 
raise floor prices by unfreezing commodity 
loan rates.  Republicans proposed and 
passed additional transition payments to be 
paid in 1998.  These additional transition 
payments were made to all eligible farmers, 
presumably to compensate them for low 
prices.  In addition, those farmers who 
experienced crop losses received double 
insurance indemnities if they had purchased 
crop insurance, and single indemnities if 
they had not. 
There are two lessons to be learned from 
passage of the 1998 assistance package.  
First, political support for agricultural 
subsidies remains strong.  Second, there 
seems to be a need to justify these subsidies 
as compensation for hard times.  The 
additional transition payments compensated 
producers for low prices and the disaster 
payments compensated producers for crop 
losses.  Thus, given the current political and 
economic environment, Congress seems 
poised to expand federal involvement in 
agriculture, and that involvement is likely to 
take the form of a safety net. 
 
The phrase “safety net” conjures an 
image of a trapeze artist who, through no 
fault of his own, finds himself falling to 
earth only to be saved by a net.  The net for 
the trapeze artist is analogous to an 
insurance policy.  The insurance premium is 
the cost of acquiring the net, setting it up 
and taking it down for each performance.  
 
This briefing paper provides insight into three current policy issues: 
 
•= What types of agricultural insurance products provide the most insurance 
benefits to farmers? 
•= How are insurance benefits affected by the loan rate provisions of 
agricultural commodity policy? 
•= How can insurance products be designed to meet farmers’ demands for 
more coverage at an affordable price? 
 
Numerical simulations of representative farms in Iowa and North Dakota are 
used to gain insight into these questions. 
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An indemnity is collected only if the artist 
falls.  If the expected, or long-run average 
value to the artist of the indemnity is greater 
than the cost of the premium, the insurance 
policy is purchased (a net is used).  This 
analogy suggests that estimation of the 
benefits, or value, of alternative agricultural 
insurance schemes will provide insight into 
determining how a safety net for agriculture 
should be developed. 
What Is Agricultural Insurance? 
An insurance policy is a contract that 
pays an indemnity to the insured when a 
covered peril occurs.  In agriculture, perils 
abound.  Crops can be damaged from 
disease, drought, flood, insects, weeds, hail, 
wind, loss of irrigation water, freezes, 
temperature and excess heat.  And livestock 
can be lost due to hazardous weather.  Other 
perils include low prices for crops due to 
unexpected shifts in demand, or bumper 
crops and high prices for inputs, such as 
feed, fuel, fertilizer, and capital. 
 
These perils create a demand for an 
insurance contract that compensates the 
contract owner for damage caused by the 
peril.  For many perils, the willingness to 
pay for such a contract exceeds the actual 
expected monetary loss.1  This enhanced 
willingness to pay can occur because of the 
realization that the impact of some losses 
can be devastating.  For example, a crop loss 
may lead to a loss of financing, which could 
lead to the loss of the farm.  A producer’s 
willingness to pay to remain on his or her 
farm may be greater than the expected loss 
on a policy that covers the crop loss. 
 
An enhanced willingness to pay creates 
the possibility that an insurance company 
will be there to cover the peril.  The 
insurance company will require a premium 
that covers  
 
 
•= the expected loss from the peril; 
•= the cost of writing and adjusting the 
policy; and  
•= the opportunity cost of investment.   
 
Only when the willingness to pay to cover 
the peril is equal to or greater than the total 
premium required for an insurer to cover 
the peril, will private insurance markets 
emerge.2 
 
Thus, an assessment of producers’ 
willingness to pay for coverage of loss due 
to peril will determine whether a program or 
product has safety net characteristics.  An 
equivalent assessment is to calculate how 
much the safety net program or product 
increases the benefit from farming as 
measured by certainty equivalent returns.3 
 
The insurance products that increase the 
benefit from farming by little more than the 
expected loss (which equals the average 
insurance indemnity) from insuring a peril 
are not consistent with a safety net policy 
objective.  Those that greatly exceed the 
expected loss are the programs that will give 
the greatest return to government investment 
in agriculture.  Not surprisingly, the 
products where the expected loss is small 
relative to the change in farming benefit are 
those that would most likely be provided by 
the private insurance market. 
Willingness to Pay to Avoid Risk 
A representative 500-acre farm in Black 
Hawk County, Iowa, is used in our 
examination of willingness to avoid risk.  
This farm has 250 acres of corn and 250 
acres of soybeans.  The operation faces two 
primary sources of risk: price and yield.  
Expected price at harvest is $2.15/bu for 
corn and $4.81/bu for soybeans.  Expected 
yield is 130 bu/ac for corn and 40 bu/ac for 
soybeans. 
 
Provision of a Safety Net for U.S. Agriculture / 3 
 
Figure 1. CDF and Histogram of Per-Acre Gross 
Revenue from a Black Hawk County Corn and Soybean 
Farmer in 1999
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The amount of price risk can be estimated 
from the Chicago Board of Trade implied 
volatility report.  For this farm, price 
volatilities are 0.20 for corn and 0.18 for 
soybeans.  The amount of yield risk that this 
farm faces can be inferred from the premium 
charged for federal crop insurance.  For this 
farm, the base premium rate for crop 
insurance is 3.6 percent for corn and 2.6 
percent for soybean at the 65 percent 
coverage level. 
 
This farmer cares about the amount of net 
revenue his 500 acres will generate in a 
year.  But, given the large amount of yield 
and price risk, he cannot be certain what the 
revenue will be.  Figure 1 shows two 
characterizations of the revenue risk faced 
by this farmer as of March 15, 1999.  The 
bar chart is a histogram.  The horizontal axis 
shows the revenue outcomes that are 
possible.  As shown, per-acre revenue can 
range from about $50/ac to over $500/ac for 
this farmer.  The height of the bar equals the 
probability that actual revenue outcome will 
fall in a given revenue “bin.”  Because the 
histogram shows all possible outcomes, the 
height of all bars added together equals 1.0.4 
 
The line chart in Figure 1 is the 
cumulative distribution function of revenue 
risk.  It shows the same risk as the histogram 
but now the vertical axis measures the 
probability that gross revenue will be less 
than or equal to a given value.  As shown, 
there is about a 35 percent chance that gross 
revenue will be less than $200/acre.5  And, 
there is an 80 percent chance that revenue 
will be less than $300.  Thus, there is a 45 
percent chance that revenue will be between 
$200 and $300 per acre. 
 
Most agricultural producers would prefer 
to avoid the type of risk shown in Figure 1.  
This risk makes planning difficult and raises 
the possibility of bankruptcy.  The expected 
value of revenue is about $234/ac.  If 
offered a choice between a certain $234 and 
the risk shown in Figure 1, most producers 
would choose the certain $234. 
 
This preference suggests that many 
producers would also be willing to pay 
something for certainty.  That is, they would 
be willing to pay an insurance premium in 
order to receive the $234 and not face the 
risk.  Their net position after paying the 
premium is $234 less the premium.  We can 
judge a producer’s aversion to risk by 
estimating the maximum the producer would 
be willing to pay to avoid the risk and obtain 
the $234.  In the calculations that follow, our 
representative producer would be willing to 
pay a maximum of $18/ac ($9000 for the 
500-acre farm) to avoid the risk.  This 
willingness to avoid risk creates an 
opportunity for development of insurance 
markets. 
Insurance Benefits of Alternative 
Products 
A variety of insurance products is 
currently available to our Iowa corn-soybean 
farmer.  These include yield insurance, 
which pays an indemnity when yield is low; 
price insurance, which covers low prices; 
and revenue insurance, which covers low 
gross revenue (price B yield).  In addition, 
there exists “combined crop” revenue 
insurance, which pays when corn revenue 
plus soybean revenue is low.6 
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Figure 2. Net Increase in Certainty Equivalent 
Returns from Alternative Risk Management 
Tools
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Figure 2 shows the per-acre net producer 
benefits from these products for three 
coverage levels.  Net producer benefit 
equals the change in the certainty equivalent 
returns from farming this land with the 
producer paying the actuarially fair value of 
the insurance product.7  The yield insurance 
covers 65 percent, 75 percent, and 85 
percent of expected yield of corn and 
soybeans separately.  The revenue insurance 
product and CRC8 covers 65 percent, 75 
percent, and 85 percent of expected price 
times expected yield for each crop 
separately.  The price insurance offers put 
options with a strike price, 3 percent out of 
the money on 65 percent, 75 percent, and 85 
percent of expected production.  And the 
combined crop revenue insurance (WF 
Revenue in Figure 2) covers 65 percent, 75 
percent, and 85 percent of the acreage-
weighted average of expected price B  
expected yield for each crop.  
 
As shown in Figure 2, the net benefit to 
the three revenue insurance products is 
greater than the net benefit to the yield 
product or the two price products.  This 
should not be too surprising because utility 
is defined on revenue.  What may be 
surprising is the low insurance benefit of 
price insurance tools relative to the yield 
insurance.  The reason for this is that the 
main source of risk within a growing season 
is yield, not price.  Hence, even after a put 
option on price is purchased, the farmer still 
faces significant revenue risk because of 
yield variability. 
 
Of course, a positive net benefit is not the 
only determinant in whether farmers will 
actually purchase an insurance product.  A 
positive net benefit simply suggests that a 
market might emerge.  A practical factor 
influencing producers’ purchase decisions is 
the magnitude of the insurance premium. 
The fair premiums for the products 
illustrated in Figure 2 are shown in Figure 3. 
A comparison of Figures 2 and 3 show that 
there is not a one-to-one correspondence 
between net benefit and premium.  That is, 
those products that cost more do not 
necessarily return the most in insurance 
benefit.  For example, CRC costs 
significantly more than the combined crop 
revenue insurance product but it does not 
yield significantly more insurance benefits.  
And the price insurance at a 65 percent 
coverage level costs more than the other 
products but returns far less in net benefits.  
An alternative measure of benefit is shown 
in Figure 4 where the ratio of benefits to 
cost is graphed.  If the ratio equals 1.0, then 
a private market for insurance will not 
emerge. 
 
As shown in Figure 4, yield and revenue 
insurance all have benefit-cost ratios 
Figure 3. Actuarially Fair Premia for
Alternative Risk Management Tools
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
APH Put RA CRC WF
Revenue
$/
ac
re 0.65
0.75
0.85
Coverage
Level
Provision of a Safety Net for U.S. Agriculture / 5 
 
between 1.4 and 1.8, which correspond 
closely with published ratios.9 
Effect of Loan Deficiency Payments on 
Insurance Benefits 
The high benefit-to-cost ratios of the 
revenue products are not surprising because 
revenue risk is the risk that affects utility. 
But are these high ratios maintained when 
the price protection from loan deficiency 
payments (LDP) are available to farmers?  
Farmers are eligible to receive an LDP when 
the posted county price falls below the 
county loan rate.  The size of the LDP 
equals the difference between the loan rate 
and the posted county price multiplied by 
harvested production.  The loan rates for the 
example farm in Black Hawk County are 
$5.10/bu for soybeans and $1.80/bu for 
corn.  The expected local price (a proxy for 
the posted county price) for this example 
farm is $4.81/bu for soybeans and $2.14/bu 
for corn.  The per-bushel expected value of 
the LDP is $.497 for soybeans and $.054 for 
corn. 
 
Some have called the LDP a put option 
on price with the loan rate being the strike 
price.  But a significant difference between a 
put option and an LDP is that the LDP pays 
off on harvested bushels whereas the put 
option pays off on a fixed number of bushels 
specified in the contract. 
 
Table 1 shows the effect on the net 
insurance benefit from the LDP.  The entries 
are the percentage change in the change in 
certainty equivalent returns due to the 
insurance product.  As shown, the LDP 
actually increases the insurance benefit of 
yield insurance by between 15 percent and 
16 percent.  The LDP has little effect on  the 
single crop and combined crop revenue 
insurance.  The net benefit of CRC increases 
by a small amount.  Not surprisingly, the 
largest change in insurance benefit is with 
price insurance, where nearly all the benefits 
are replaced by the LDP.  This suggests that 
the demand for put options on the Chicago 
Board of Trade is quite strongly affected by 
the LDP in 1999. 
 
It seems surprising that the insurance 
benefits of the revenue insurance products 
are not adversely affected by LDPs.  After 
all, revenue insurance is valuable because it 
protects a producer against declines in either 
price or yield.  The LDP should substitute 
for the price component of revenue 
Figure 4. Ratio of Change in Certainty 
Equivalent Returns to Fair Premium for 
Alternative Risk Management Tools
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Table 1. Percentage change in insurance benefit due to LDP 
 Coverage Level 
 65% 75% 85% 
Yield Insurance 15.0% 15.6% 16.2% 
Price Insurance -81.5% -84.9% -88.7% 
Revenue Insurance 1.9% 0.5% -1.0% 
CRC 6.7% 5.7% 4.9% 
Combined Crop Revenue  
   Insurance 
1.2% 0.2% -3.2% 
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insurance.  But what must be remembered is 
that, for this example farmer, yield risk is 
the single most important source of revenue 
variability.  The LDP option does nothing 
about this source of risk, so revenue 
insurance still provides a significant amount 
of coverage.  Also, the amount of price 
protection offered by LDPs depends on 
harvested production, not actual production. 
So, when both price and yield are low, the 
LDP does not offer much insurance benefit. 
The LDPs pay off the most when price is 
low and yield high (as occurred in Iowa in 
1998).  For many farmers a low price and a 
high yield imply a high gross revenue, and 
price protection does not offer significant 
insurance benefits. 
Increased Coverage Levels 
One of the complaints heard from 
farmers is that they need greater insurance 
coverage at affordable prices.  As shown in 
Figure 2, the net insurance benefit increases 
as coverage level increases.  But Figure 4 
shows that the benefit-to-cost ratio declines 
as coverage level increases, which means 
that the actuarially fair premiums rise faster 
than the insurance benefit as coverage 
increases.  Figure 4 results indicate that as 
measured by a benefit-to-cost ratio, 
increased coverage increases total benefits, 
but at a declining rate.  This suggests that 
farmers may benefit from coverage levels in 
excess of 75 percent, which is the maximum 
coverage level available on a widespread 
basis under USDA crop insurance programs. 
 
In response to perceived demand, 
USDA’s Risk Management Agency (RMA) 
is offering 80 percent and 85 percent 
coverage in selected counties and for 
selected crops under the APH (yield 
insurance) program.  One of these counties 
is Cass County, North Dakota, for wheat. 
 
Figure 5 shows the base (unsubsidized) 
premium for two farms in Cass County.  
One farmer has an expected yield of 40 
bu/ac, the other has an expected yield of 22 
bu/ac.  As shown, the per-acre premiums are 
not that far apart.  This implies that the 
premium rate ($ of premium per $ of 
liability) for the low-yield farmer is much 
higher than for the high-yield farmer. 
The most popular level of coverage 
available across most areas of the United 
States is 65 percent even though 75 percent 
coverage has always been available.  How 
likely is it that producers will opt for more 
than 75 percent coverage when they believe 
the level of coverage is too expensive?  One 
cannot answer this question merely by 
looking at the level of premium shown in 
Figure 5.  Premium is calculated by applying 
a premium rate to an amount of liability.  
The premium rate is an average rate because 
it applies to all dollars of liability. 
 
 To determine if a producer will find it 
beneficial to purchase additional coverage 
(liability), it is more instructive to consider 
the additional premium per additional dollar 
of liability.  If the additional or marginal 
cost is excessively high, then producers 
won’t buy the additional coverage. 
 
There is a logical maximum limit above 
which marginal cost should not rise.  
Consider the cost of the dollar of liability 
that results in a 100 percent coverage level.  
Figure 5. Base Premiums for Cass County, ND Wheat
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With a symmetric yield distribution, there is 
a 50 percent chance that an indemnity will 
be paid on this dollar.  There is also a 50 
percent chance that it won’t be paid.  Thus, 
the expected indemnity on this last dollar is 
$0.50.  So, the marginal premium rate is 50 
percent.  This is the maximum marginal 
premium rate because the probability of a 
loss on the dollar of liability typically 
declines as coverage level decreases. 
 
Figure 6 shows the marginal cost of 
additional liability to our Cass County wheat 
farmer.  As shown, the marginal cost 
exceeds $0.50 for the 40 bu/ac farm as 
coverage goes from 75 to 80 percent and 
from 80 to 85 percent.  The marginal cost 
exceeds $0.50 for the 22 bu/ac farmer even 
as coverage goes from 65 to 70 percent.  It 
actually exceeds $1.00 as coverage goes 
from 75 to 80 percent and from 80 to 85 
percent.  That is, this producer would be 
paying more premium than he receives in 
increased liability. 
 
Clearly, this producer, if he buys crop 
insurance, would purchase only the 65 
percent level.  All other levels of insurance 
are simply worth more than he could ever 
find valuable. 
 
How can RMA justify such high 
marginal rates?  There are two possible 
justifications.  The first is that such high 
rates are justified if insurance fraud is 
increasingly likely at high coverage levels.  
This fraud could result in, at the limit, a 100 
percent chance of paying out an indemnity, 
thus justifying a high rate.  The implication 
is that any producer who purchases 80 to 85 
percent wheat coverage in Cass County 
should be the target of a fraud 
investigation.10 
 
The second justification is that RMA has 
no freedom to set lower marginal rates 
because of restrictions on its rate-making 
procedures. RMA attempts to set actuarially 
fair rates at the 65 percent coverage level 
based on historic loss data.  The 65 percent 
rates are subsidized by a factor of 41.7 
percent.  RMA is forced to hold the per-acre 
subsidy constant and use subsidy factors of 
31.9 percent for 70 percent coverage and 
23.5 percent for 75 percent coverage.  Thus 
the 70 percent and 75 percent premiums are 
determined solely by these subsidy factors. 
 
To illustrate, the per-acre premium 
subsidy for our North Dakota wheat farmer 
is $2.39/ac for the 40 bu/ac farm.  This 
implies that the 70 percent premium must 
equal $7.49/ac (7.49 = 2.39/.319) and the 75 
percent premium must $10.17/ac  
(10.17 = 2.39/.235).  The relationship 
between the subsidy factors determine the 
rates as coverage levels increase.  The “rate 
relativity” between 70 percent and 65 
percent coverage is 1.31.  That is, 70 percent 
premiums equal 65 percent premiums 
multiplied by 1.31.  The 70 to 75 percent 
rate relativity equals 1.35. 
 
The rate relativities between 75 percent 
and 80 percent coverage and between 80 
percent and 85 percent coverage are also 
1.35 in Cass County.  It seems that RMA 
simply applied the 70 to 75 percent rate 
relativity to the higher coverage levels.  The 
results are the high marginal rates shown in 
Figure 6. Incremental APH Cost of An Additional
      Dollar of Liability for Cass County Wheat
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Figure 5.  Clearly these high marginal rates 
do not meet the request by farmers for 
higher coverage levels at affordable prices. 
 
If increased coverage is a policy 
objective, how can APH rates be set to make 
higher coverage levels affordable?  The 
preferred approach is to set base premium 
rates so that they reflect actual risk as shown 
in Figure 1.  That is, the rates should be 
based on a well-defined distribution.  When 
this is done, the marginal cost of additional 
liability is much lower as shown in Figure 7.  
Figures 8 and 9 show a comparison RMA 
yield insurance rate and distribution-based 
insurance rates. 
 
But simply basing rates on a well-defined 
distribution does nothing about an increased 
propensity to commit fraud as coverage 
increases.  Evidence for insurance fraud is 
that the loss ratios at 75 percent coverage are 
generally higher than at 65 percent coverage 
even though as one goes from 65 percent to 
75 percent coverage the rate increase is 
greater than the expected increase in losses 
based solely on a well-defined yield 
distribution. 
 
There are two approaches that can 
account for fraud.  The first is to explicitly 
load rates for fraud.  If this results in rates 
that are too high, then so be it—and nobody 
will purchase the insurance.  The 
disadvantage of this approach is, as 
mentioned above, the farmers who purchase 
fraud-loaded insurance will be those who 
expect to benefit from it.  This will be either 
extremely risk averse individuals or those 
who will commit greater fraud than the load 
assumes. 
 
An alternative approach is to offer 
insurance products that reduce the incentive 
to commit fraud.  Fraud reduction can be 
obtained by insuring multiple enterprises on 
a single insurance contract.  These 
enterprises can be multiple locations where 
the same crop is grown, or multiple crops, or 
both.  The incentive to commit fraud is 
lowered for multiple locations because it 
makes it more difficult to move production 
from unit to unit.  One possible means of 
making a fraudulent insurance claim is to 
take production from one location to another 
and make a claim on one of the locations.  
Such movement would be pointless if both 
locations were insured together. 
Figure 8. A Comparison of Incremental Cost of Additional
Liability (Cass County Wheat Farmer 40 bu/ac)
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Figure 9. A Comparison of Incremental Cost of
Additional Liability (Cass County Wheat Farm 20 bu/ac)
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Figure 7. Incremental Cost of An Additional Dollar
of Liability for Yield Insurance Based on Yield Distribution
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The incentive to commit fraud is also 
lower when multiple crops are combined.  
Consider the Webster County corn and 
soybean farmer.  Suppose the soybean crop 
didn’t look like it was going to yield well, 
and the farmer was considering reducing its 
care in the hope of collecting an insurance 
indemnity.  The problem with this course of 
action is that the farmer runs the risk of the 
corn revenue coming in at a high level and 
more than compensating for the lost soybean 
revenue.  Thus, the actions taken would end 
up hurting the farmer. 
 
Thus, enterprise coverage and combined-
crop or whole-farm insurance policies can 
lower the incentives to commit fraud thus 
allowing actuarially fair rates to be 
implemented.  In addition, enterprise and 
combined crop policies offer the benefit that 
the actuarially fair insurance premium rates 
decline, thus allowing producers to purchase 
more coverage without increasing 
premiums.  This decline in premium is due 
to spatial diversification and/or crop 
diversification. 
 
Figure 10 shows how combined crop 
revenue insurance premiums compare to the 
average single crop premium for a corn-
soybean-wheat farmer in Cass County, 
North Dakota.  This farmer is assumed to 
plant equal acres of each crop. As is readily 
apparent, one option for meeting the farmer 
request for additional coverage at affordable 
prices is to offer whole-farm policies.  The 
premium for 85 percent combined crop 
coverage is about equal to the premium for 
75 percent single crop yield insurance, and 
about half the premium for single crop yield 
insurance at 85 percent coverage. Thus, 
whole-farm coverage allows a producer to 
pay significantly less for the same coverage 
level or to pay the same premium but obtain 
a significantly greater coverage level. 
 
Of course, one objection to the 
comparison in Figure 10 is to point to the 
results in Figure 7 that show the premiums 
for yield insurance are loaded for fraud 
whereas the premiums shown in Figure 10 
for combined crop revenue insurance are 
not.  Thus, to show the effects on premium 
from combining units, Figure 11 compares 
the average premium for single crop revenue 
insurance for the Cass County corn-
soybean-wheat farmer to the premium for a 
whole-farm revenue insurance.  The 
premium for 85 percent coverage is below 
the average single-crop premium at 75 
percent coverage.  And the 85 percent 
premium for whole-farm coverage is 35 
percent below the average single-crop 
premium at 85 percent. 
Concluding Remarks 
Routing government subsidies to 
agriculture through provision of an 
improved safety net for farmers seems 
inevitable in 1999.  But disagreement about 
what constitutes a safety net and how to 
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improve the existing crop insurance policy is 
a source of contention.  Some argue that a 
safety net is provided with higher 
guaranteed prices.  Others argue that crop 
insurance should be expanded in terms of 
available coverage levels and the number of 
crops covered.  And some argue for whole-
farm revenue insurance policies that cover 
crops as well as livestock. 
 
This briefing paper shows that for 
Midwestern crop production, yield or 
revenue insurance policies provide the 
greatest level of insurance benefits, with 
revenue insurance providing the greatest 
benefits, both in levels and benefits per 
dollar of insurance premium. Price insurance 
provides relatively few insurance benefits to 
Midwestern crop producers.  
Simulation results also show that LDPs 
complement yield insurance in the sense that 
the existence of LDPs increases the 
insurance benefits of yield insurance.  LDPs 
have little effect on the insurance benefits 
from revenue insurance, whereas they are 
nearly perfect substitutes for price insurance. 
And finally, current rates for yield insurance 
at the high coverage levels available in 1999 
on a pilot basis are so high that they do not 
provide a basis for a better safety net. 
Combining insurance units of the same crop 
or combining crops into a whole-farm 
revenue insurance policy is a viable option 
to provide increased coverage level at a 
reasonable premium without encouraging 
insurance fraud. 
 
 
 
Endnotes 
 
1. The expected monetary loss is the average indemnity paid over many insurance policies in a 
given year or paid on a single policy over many years. 
2. Of course, premium subsidies can increase the demand for insurance sufficiently to create a 
market. 
3. Certainty equivalent returns from farming is the maximum amount of money that an 
individual would pay to take a farming risk. 
4. Prices are assumed to be log normally distributed and yields follow a beta distribution.  Corn 
and soybean yields are correlated at +0.7 corn and soybean prices are correlated at 0.8.  
Price-yield correlations are -0.4 for corn and -0.2 for soybeans.  These correlations are 
consistent with those used to rate Revenue Assurance. 
5. The same 35 percent can also be found in Figure 1 by adding the height of all bars that are to 
the left of 200. 
6. Revenue Assurance offers a combined crop revenue insurance policy to corn and soybean 
growers in Iowa, Minnesota, South Dakota, North Dakota and Illinois.  In addition, corn-
soybean-wheat insurance is offered to North Dakota producers. 
7. A negative exponential utility function was used with a risk aversion coefficient set so the 
risk premium without insurance equals 20 percent of the standard deviation of gross revenue 
without insurance. 
8. The product labeled CRC performs the same as the commercial product of the same name in 
that the revenue guarantee increases if the harvest price is greater than the springtime price. 
9. See Hennessy, D., B. A. Babcock, and D. Hayes.  “The Budgetary and Producer Welfare 
Effects of Revenue Assurance,” American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 79(August 
1997):1024-34. 
10. An important caveat to this statement is that the presence on available premium subsidy may 
make 80 percent corn attractive to some wheat farmers in Cass County
